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INTRODUCTION
The Post Conviction Relief Act1 ("PCRA" or "the Act") provides a procedure for defendants to collaterally challenge their conviction or sentence. It is the sole means 2 of
obtaining state collateral relief. The PCRA has been broadly interpreted 3 as creating a
unified statutory framework for reviewing claims that were traditionally cognizable
in state habeas corpus. 4 The Act permits defendants in custody 5 to seek relief when
the conviction or sentence results in one or more of the Act's enumerated errors or
defects 6 and when the claimed error has not been waived 7 or previously litigated 8 on
direct appeal or in a previous PCRA petition. Subject to several narrow exceptions, a
petition under the Act must be filed within one year of the date the defendant's judgment of sentence becomes final. 9 This article reports on a number of recent decisions
of the Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Court construing provisions of the Act.

* Professor of Law, Penn State-Dickinson Law and the author of the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Act-Practice
and
Procedure (2016 Ed).
1. 42 Pa.C.S. §9541 et seq.
2. 42 Pa.C.S. §9542.
3. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa.
1999);
Commonwealth ex rel. Dadariov. Goldberg, 773 A.2d 126 (Pa. 2001).
4. 42 Pa.C.S. §6501 et seq.
5. 42 Pa.C.S §9543(a)(1). The Act requires a defendant to be in custody"at the time relief is granted."
6. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2). To avoid a bifurcated system of post-conviction relief, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has
not limited the PCRA to its specifically enumerated areas of review. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d
630 (Pa.
2003) (Act applies to claim that counsel failed to file a petition for allowance of appeal).
7. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(4), 9544(b).
8. 42 Pa.C.S. §9544(a).
9. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b).

32

PENNSYLVANIA

BAR ASSOCIATION QUARTERLY

I January 2016

Post Conviction Developments In Pennsylvania

33

DUE DILIGENCE, PUBLIC RECORDS AND
THE TIMELINESS EXCEPTION
1°
A defendant who seeks to raise an after-discovered evidence claim must first establish jurisdiction by pleading and proving an exception to the one-year filing period.
The PCRA permits a defendant to seek relief after the one-year filing period if the facts
upon which the claim is based"were unknown to him and could not have been ascer1
tained by the exercise of due diligence."" Such a petition must be filed"within 60 days
12
of the date the claim could have been presented." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
13
is contained in a public record. In
if
it
"unknown"
not
has held that information is
several recent cases, the Superior Court has considered the scope of the public record
doctrine and whether a defendant had exercised due diligence.
In Commonwealth v. Burton,14 the Superior Court clariPresumption of
fied the "due diligence" requirement and recognized a
limited exception to the rule that presumes that defenaccess to infordants have access to information in public records.

Burton was convicted in 1993 of first degree murder and

conspiracy. Burton's co-defendant, Melvin Goodwine,
was convicted of conspiracy but acquitted of murder. In
2013, Burton filed a second pro se PCRA petition after he
received information from the Innocence Project that in
2009, Goodwine had filed a motion to expunge his criminal record. In the motion, he acknowledged responsibility
for the murder and claimed that "an innocent man had

gone to jail for the crime he had committed."The PCRA

matiou in public
records does not
apply when

-

PCRA

petition is

filed pro se.

court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, denied
Burton relief finding that his petition was untimely because it was not filed within the
60-day period following Goodwine's motion in 2009 and its concomitant entry into the
public domain.The lower court held that a matter contained in a public record may not
be considered "unknown" for purposes of the newly discovered facts exception to the
PCRA's one-year time bar.
The Superior Court held that the PCRA court erred in dismissing Burton's petition
as untimely and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. Initially, the court addressed the question of the appropriate level of diligence a defendant must demonstrate under the newly discovered facts exception noting that the Act does not define
the term. Relying on prior cases considering due diligence in different contexts, the
court concluded that under the PCRA, due diligence requires "neither perfect vigilance nor punctilious care," but rather "reasonable efforts ... based on the particular
circumstances, to uncover facts" that may support a claim for post-conviction relief.
Next, the court turned to the issue of material contained in public records and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision that "matters of public record are not unknown."15The court noted that the rule was not absolute as the statute required that
facts are"unknown to the petitioner" which imparts"a subjective element into the due
diligence standard...." In the court's view, an "irrebuttable presumption that public

10. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(vi). An after-discovered evidence claim requires a defendant to establish that (1) the evidence
has been discovered after trial and could not have been obtained earlier through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence
is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict.
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264,1271-72 (Pa. 2007).
11. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b)(1)(ii).
12. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b)(2).
13. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Hawkins,953 A.2d 1248,1254 (Pa. 2008) (district attorney's testimony at sentencing of witness at defendant's trial was public record and discoverable through exercise of due diligence).
14. 121 A.3d 1063 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc).
15. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2013). See also Commonwealth v. Fahy, 959 A.2d 312, 317 (Pa. 2009);
Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1254 (Pa. 2008) (district attorney's testimony at sentencing of witness who
appeared at defendant's trial was public record information and discoverable through exercise of due diligence).
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information cannot be 'unknown"' would disregard the important fact of whether the
defendant was represented by counsel or proceeding pro se. The court noted that pro se
defendants, often incarcerated, do not have access to information "otherwise readily
available to the public." The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth
v. Bennett16 as expressly recognizing the "importance of access" to public information.
The court held that the presumption of access to information in public records "does
not apply"where the untimely petition is filed by a defendant pro se. Noting that there
had not been an evidentiary record developed in the PCRA court, the court opined
that Burton's diligence may have been sufficient as he promptly filed his petition after
receiving information from the Innocence Project. The court observed that Goodwine's
motion had been filed more than ten years after Burton's judgment of sentence had
become final. It would be unrealistic, the court noted, to expect Burton to continuously
search public records to determine whether Goodwine had disclosed potentially exculpatory information concerning his case.The court held that because Burton was not
represented, absent evidence demonstrating Burton's access to the contents of
Goodwine's criminal docket, the public records rule does not apply. On remand, the
court noted that the PCRA court can consider evidence with respect to whether Burton
knew of Goodwine's motion prior to receiving the letter from the Innocence Project. 17
Due diligence and matters contained in public records were also at issue in Commonwealth v. Davis.18 Davis was convicted of robbery and first degree murder in 1972. The
Commonwealth's case included the testimony of Jerome Watson who placed Davis at
the scene of the crime and who also testified that Davis had told him he had shot the
deceased. A second witness, Michael Diggs, testified that Davis knew where he kept a
shotgun in his home and that Davis was in possession of the shotgun on the day of the
crime. Both witnesses testified that they had not been offered any form of leniency in
exchange for their testimony. In 2008, Davis filed a pro se PCRA petition under the"new
facts" exception to the filing period 19 after he had received an affidavit from Watson
stating that his testimony about Davis's confession was untrue. The pro se petition was
filed within 60 days of receiving Watson's affidavit. In a second affidavit, Watson
claimed that he was coerced into testifying falsely at Davis's trial and, after he testified,
he stated he was treated favorably by police and prosecutors with respect to outstanding felony prosecutions pending at the time. In an amended petition prepared by private counsel, Davis added a claim that the Commonwealth had improperly withheld
evidence that it had entered into agreements with both Watson and Diggs in exchange
for their testimony. In the amended petition, Davis claimed that upon receiving the
Watson affidavit, he began a search to discover Watson and Diggs' sentencing transcripts. He also alleged that he discovered Digg's sentencing transcript which revealed
that Diggs had entered into an agreement with the Commonwealth in exchange for
testifying against Davis. Davis also attached Watson's sentencing transcript to his
amended petition. In the transcript, Watson stated that he was forced to testify against
Davis. The PCRA court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, finding Davis's
16. 930 A.2d 1264, 1266 (Pa. 2007). In Bennett, PCRA counsel failed to file a brief in an appeal from
the denial of collateral relief. As a result, the appeal was dismissed. After discovering counsel's failure, the defendant
filed a second pro
se petition seeking reinstatement of appeal rights nunc pro tunc. The PCRA court granted relief
but the Superior Court
quashed the appeal finding the second petition was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, finding
that notwithstanding the fact that the court order dismissing his appeal was a matter of public record, it was a
fact unknown to the
defendant.The Court held that the order dismissing defendant's first PCRA appeal was a"matter
of'public record' only
in the broadest terms."The Court noted that it was"ilogical to believe"that a lawyer who abandons
his client by failing
to file a brief will"inform his client that the case has been dismissed because of his own failures."
Because counsel abandoned the defendant, the Court stated that it knew of"no other way in which a prisoner could access
the"public record."
As a result, "the matter of 'public record' does not appear to have been within Appellant's access."
17. In the view of the dissent, the majority's reinterpretation of the Supreme Court's"public information
doctrine is
unwarranted."The dissent objected to the majority's"subjective, status-based approach" in assessing
due diligence and
the fact that the new approach "improperly shifts"the burden on collateral review to the Commonwealth
without sufficient guidance as to how the majority's subjective considerations factor into a determination of
due diligence.
18. 86 A-3d 883 (Pa. Super. 2014).
19. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(B)(1)(i).
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petition was untimely. The court held that Watson and Diggs' agreement with the
Commonwealth came to light at their respective sentencing hearings and were a matter of public record that Davis could have discovered earlier had he exercised due diligence. As to Watson's recantation, the PCRA court noted that Watson had stated in his
affidavit that he had first informed a court in 1974 of his perjury during the trial of one
Chuck Logan. Although the PCRA court was unable to locate the transcript of the
Logan trial, the court held that Davis could have obtained this public information earlier through the exercise of due diligence.
The Superior Court reversed the PCRA court, finding that Davis's petition was
timely filed. The court noted that during Davis's trial, both witnesses denied on cross
examination having entered into any agreement that they would receive favorable
treatment if they testified against Davis. The court also noted that at no point during
the testimony of either witness, did the Commonwealth state that leniency had been
offered to Watson and/or Diggs. For these reasons, the court concluded that Davis had
no reason to search for the Watson and Diggs sentencing transcripts to look for evidence of an agreement with the Commonwealth. To hold otherwise, the court stated,
would suggest that Davis "should have assumed" that the witnesses were committing
perjury and the Common-wealth was permitting them to do so. The due diligence requirement under the PCRA"does not require a defendant to make such unreasonable
assumptions." Instead, the court concluded that the actions Davis took after receiving
the Watson affidavit and in acquiring the Watson and Diggs' sentencing transcripts
amounted to due diligence and, as a result, Davis established the governmental interference exception to the one-year filing period. The court also concluded that Davis
had satisfied the "new facts" exception to the filing period. The court found that Davis
had acted with"sufficient diligence" with respect to Watson's perjury. Attached to his
amended petition were affidavits of friends and family members who had attempted,
without success, to locate Watson after the trial to convince him to admit that he had
lied while testifying. The court found Davis had no proof that Watson had lied until he
received Watson's affidavit. The court declined to conclude that Davis could have discovered proof of Watson's perjury earlier had he sought and obtained the transcript in
the Logan trial. The court noted that the PCRA court had not been able to locate the
transcript and that it would be unreasonable to expect a pro se prisoner to do what the
to conduct an eviPCRA court could not. The case was remanded to the PCRA court
20
dentiary hearing to determine if Davis is entitled to a new trial.
In Commonwealth v. Medina,21 Medina filed a second PCRA petition in 2006 after
learning that a Commonwealth witness had recanted the testimony he had given at
Medina's trial in 1992. In the affidavit attached to Medina's petition, the witness, a child
at the time of the trial, claimed that his trial testimony had been coerced by a police
detective. Medina asserted he first learned of the recantation when the witness was
transferred to the prison where Medina was incarcerated and that his petition was
timely because it was filed within 60 days of when the witness disclosed the information to him. The PCRA court conducted extensive evidentiary hearings and entered an
order granting Medina a new trial. The Commonwealth appealed claiming Medina
had failed to prove he had exercised due diligence and, as a result, the petition was
untimely.
In affirming the decision of the PCRA court that Medina had satisfied the "new
facts"exception to the time bar, the Superior Court accepted the PCRA court's finding
that Medina had no information about the police coercion until it was disclosed to him
fourteen years later. Moreover, there was no evidence that the witness had disclosed
this information earlier to Medina or his family. In addition, the Superior Court noted

20. As the court notes, the issue of whether a petition is timely is distinct from whether the defendant is entitled to
relief based upon newly discovered evidence. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264,1270-72 (Pa. 2007).
21. 93 A.3d 1210 (Pa. Super. 2914) (en banc).

36

PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION QUARTERLY I January 2016

that the witness had testified consistently and unequivocally at trial. Therefore, it was
unlikely that cross examination would have compelled the witness to change his testimony or have revealed the coercion the witness had been subjected to.
Due diligence was again at issue in Commonwealth v. Brown.22 Brown sought postconviction relief thirteen years following his conviction for first-degree murder. At his
trial, Brown claimed he acted in self-defense. In his post-conviction petition, Brown
claimed that a witness for the Commonwealth had come forward to elaborate on his
trial testimony and provide new facts relating to the actions of the victim in the moments before the shooting. Brown alleged that the witness's new evidence would have
bolstered his claim of self-defense. He attached to his petition a declaration of the witness and a declaration from his wife indicating the precise date she had obtained the
information from the witness. Brown asserted his petition was timely because it had
been filed within 60 days of when he became aware of the new information. The PCRA
court dismissed the petition as untimely holding that the information contained in the
witness's declaration would not "compel a different verdict."
Although the Superior Court concluded that the PCRA court had improperly"conflated" the distinct requirements of whether the petition was timely under the "new
facts" exception to the filing period with the "after discovered evidence" analysis under Section 9543(a)(1)(vi), the court nonetheless affirmed the denial of relief. The court
concluded that at no point during cross examination at trial did Brown seek to elicit
from the witness the facts contained in the witness's declaration. Nor did Brown
explain why he was unable to discover the information earlier through the exercise of
due diligence. Specifically, the court noted that Brown made no claim that he had
attempted to contact the witness at any point after the trial to determine whether the
witness had additional information about the events immediately preceding the
shooting. The court held that because Brown had not satisfied the "new facts" exception to the filing period, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the substantive
merits of Brown's after discovered evidence claim.
INEFFECTIVENESS OF PCRA COUNSEL AND RESPONSE
TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS
Pennsylvania provides indigent defendants a rule-based right to appointed counsel
upon filing of an initial petition for post-conviction relief.23 Although the right to counsel includes "the concomitant right to effective assistance of counsel,"24 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is"no formal mechanism designed
to specifically capture claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness defaulted by initial review
PCRA counsel."25 Ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel cannot be raised on direct appeal
from the denial of PCRA relief because such a claim would constitute a serial petition
in violation of the PCRA time-bar.26 Moreover, the court has stated, the PCRA does not
permit "a second round of collateral attack focusing on the performance of PCRA
counsel."The problem of a "right without a remedy" has led the court to acknowledge
that it "has struggled with the question of how to enforce the 'enforceable' right of
effective PCRA counsel... ." 27

22. 111 A.3d 171 (Pa. Super. 2015).
23. Pa.R.Crirn P. 904.
24. Commonwealth v. Albert, 561 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1989). See also Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 699 (Pa. 1998)
(power to"review, and if necessary, remedy the deficiencies of counsel at the post conviction stage" not "circumscribed
by the parameters of the Sixth Amendment."
25. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 584 (Pa. 2013).
26. Commonwealth v. Pitts,981 A.2d 875, 879 (Pa. 2009). See also Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 893, n. 12 (Pa.
2010); Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032,1044 n.14 (Pa. 2011). For an argument that there has not been a binding, precedential decision by the Supreme Court prohibiting review of claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel presented for
the first time on appeal and that the Superior Court has rendered conflicting decisions on the issue, see Commonwealth
v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 47 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (Bender, P.J. dissenting).
27. Holmes, 79 A.2d at 584.
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Even though there is no"formal mechanism"to challenge the effectiveness of PCRA
to the PCRA
counsel, a defendant can assert a claim of ineffectiveness in response
28
907
Pa.R.Crim.P.
The
petition.
defendant's
the
dismiss
to
court's notice of intention
notice is required only in cases where the court concludes that defendant is not enti29
tled to an evidentiary hearing. The Rule permits the defendant to respond to the prov. Smith,30
posed dismissal within 20 days of the date of the notice. In Commonwealth
Smith's initial PCRA petition was dismissed without a hearing after the court had
issued a Rule 907 notice of dismissal to which neither counsel nor Smith responded.
On appeal, Smith argued that the notice of dismissal was defective because it did not
inform him of his right to effective PCRA counsel and his right to challenge the effectiveness of PCRA counsel in his response to the court's notice. Smith claimed that the
defective notice violated his right to due process and precluded a finding that he had
waived his right to challenge the effectiveness of PCRA counsel.
In affirming the dismissal of Smith's petition, the Superior Court held that Smith
had waived claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel 31by not raising them in a
response to the PCRA court's notice of intent to dismiss. The court stated that the
defendant had a duty to "preserve his claims" and that if he had wanted to assert
claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel,"he should have consulted counsel and/or
the court to learn the correct procedure.""Neither the Commonwealth nor the court
defendant on how to preserve his claim of ineffectiveness
had any duty to instruct"the
32
of PCRA counsel.

COLLATERAL REVIEW AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
Court held that Eighth Amendment
In Akins v. Virginia,33 the United States Supreme 34
prohibited the execution of intellectually disabled persons. The Court left the determination of how to apply the prohibition to the individual states. In Commonwealth v.
Miller,35 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set out the procedure for the resolution of

28 Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 880, n.4 (Pa. 2009) ("[Plitt's failure, prior to his PCRA appeal, to argue PCRA
counsel's ineffectiveness for not raising the direct appeal issue results in waiver of the issue of PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness.... Although Pitts asserts that his PCRA appeal was the first opportunity he had to challenge PCRA counsel's
stewardship because he was no longer represented by PCRA counsel, he could have challenged PCRA counsel's stewardship after receiving counsel's withdrawal letter and the notice of the PCRA court's intent to dismiss his petition
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim P. 907, yet he failed to do so.") In Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177 (Pa. Super. 2012),
the Superior Court held that a claim of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel raised for the first time in a response to a
notice of intent to dismiss a defendant's PCRA petition is not a second, serial or amended petition but instead an "objection to dismissal." In Rykard, the court concluded that defendant had waived his claim of ineffectiveness of PCRA
counsel by not raising it in response the PCRA court's notice of intent to dismiss his petition. See also Commonwealth v.
Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080 (Pa. Super. 2014) ("[W]here the new issue is one concerning PCRA counsel's representation, a petitioner can preserve by including that claim in his Rule 907 response or raising the issue while the PCRA court retains
jurisdiction.").
29. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035,1040 (Pa. Super. 2007) ("[A] petitioner is not entitled to a PCRA hearing as
a matter of right; the PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing if there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact
and the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no purpose would be served by any further
proceedings.").
30. 121.3d 1049 (Pa. Super. 2015).
31. The court noted that a claim of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel cannot be raised for the first time in a Rule
1925(b) statement. Commonwealth v. Jette,23 A.3d 1032,1044 n.14 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Ford,44 A.3d 1190 (Pa. Super.
2012).
32. If defendants are not informed by the PCRA court that a claim of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel is waived unless it is raised in response to the court's notice of intention to dismiss, few, if any, defendants will know that a response
to the court's intention to dismiss is the only procedure to challenge the effectiveness of PCRA counsel. Rule 907 does
not address this issue and it is unlikely that defendants, many of whom will be incarcerated, will have the knowledge
and access to legal materials to discover the Supreme and Superior Court decisions establishing the procedure. Nor is
it realistic to assume that PCRA counsel will advise the defendant of the procedure. As the United States Supreme Court
noted in Halbertv. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 620 n.5 (2005),"[A] lawyer may not ... perceive his own errors...."
33. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
34. In light of a change in terminology in the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, the term"intellectual disability" is now used to describe what was heretofore referred to a"mental retardation." See Hall v. Florida,134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
35. 888 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2005).
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Adkins claims on collateral review. 36 The court held that the defendant must establish
intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence using either the definition
provided by the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (APA/DSM-IV) or the definition developed by the American Association of Mental Retardation renamed the American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Difficulties. These definitions require a defendant to establish limited
intellectual functioning as evidenced by an IQ score below the 65-75 range, significant
adoptive limitations, 37 and age of onset before age 18.The court held that there was no
"cut-off IQ."38 Rather, it is the "interaction between limited intellectual functioning
and deficiencies in adaptive skills" that establish intellectual disability. Following
Miller, in Commonwealth v. Crawley,39 the court addressed the question of what level of
deference should be given a PCRA court's determination of intellectual disability. The
court noted that the issue presented a mixed question of law and fact and that the
more fact intensive a determination is, "the more deference a reviewing court should
give" to the conclusion reached by the PCRA court. The court held that whether a defendant fits the definition of intellectual disability is "fact intensive as it will primarily
be based on upon the testimony of experts and involve multiple credibility determinations."The standard therefore is"whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the legal conclusion drawn therefrom is clearly erroneous."The court noted that it chose this "highly deferential" standard because "the
court that finds the facts will know them better than the reviewing court will, and so
its application of the law to the facts is likely to be more accurate." 4°
In Commonwealth v. Hackett,41 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sharply divided on
the application of the Crawley standard in reviewing a PCRA court's decision finding
that the defendant was intellectually disabled and vacating his death sentence. Hackett
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1988. Following the Adkins decision, Hackett sought PCRA relief on grounds that he was intellectually disabled.
During multiple hearings over a period of six months, the PCRA court heard testimony
from four defense experts, the testimony of family members concerning the defendant's exposure to multiple toxins and his involvement in a boxing club when he was
fourteen. One expert testified for the Commonwealth.
Much of the testimony of the experts concerned Hackett's IQ tests. Prior to his
Adkins petition, Hackett had three IQ scores of 80 or above on tests administered at
ages 8, 15 and 23. Seven years after his petition was filed, Hackett's IQ on the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale was 57.The expert who administered the post-petition Wechsler
IQ test, a neuropsychologist, testified that he believed Hackett had not manipulated
the score. In addition, he questioned the reliability of the prior tests particularly the
Beta-2 test administered by prison officials when Hackett was 23.The expert also found
that Hackett had adaptive limitations based upon reports of other experts, family
members and trial counsel. A second expert, a forensic neuropsychologist, testified
that the post-petition IQ test was scored correctly and that there was no evidence that
Hackett was malingering. This expert also cast doubt on the Beta-2 test, stating that it

36. In Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24 (Pa. 2011), the Court established a process for Adkins claims originating at
trial. The Court reaffirmed that the burden of proof is on the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition,
the Court held that the jury decides the Adkins claim at the penalty phase prior to considering aggravators and mitigators and that the jury's finding of intellectual disability must be unanimous.
37. In Commonwealth v. DeJesus,58 A.3d 62 (Pa. 2012), the Court approved the use of the evidentiary factors set out in
Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W. 3d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) which focus on the adoptive function element of the Adkins test.
38. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 61 A.3d 979 (Pa. 2013), the Court explained that although an individual's IQ was the
pnmary measurement of limited intellectual function, individuals with scores above and below 70 are both required to
demonstrate major deficiencies in adaptive behavior in order to be found intellectually disabled. In Hall v. Florida,134
S.Ct. 1986 (2014), the United States Supreme Court held that a strict IQ test score cut-off at 70 was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
39. 924 A.2d 612 (Pa. 2007).
40. Thomas v. GeneralMotors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307-08 (7th Cir. 2002).
41. 99 A.3d 11 (Pa. 2014).
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should not be used to assess intellectual disability, and attributed the significant drop
in Hackett's IQ to participation in a boxing program and exposure to toxic chemicals.
This expert also found deficits in adaptive functioning. The third expert, a psychiatrist,
testified that the Beta test did not properly test for intellectual disability and that
Hackett's first two test scores could not be validated without the raw data. While
Hackett's fourth expert, the director of the neuropsychology laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania, did not test Hackett's IQ or assess his adaptive functioning, she
testified that the multiple tests she administered established that Hackett exhibited
"neuropsychological impairment and 'mental retardation'" and that her results of the
tests substantiated the Wechler IQ score of 57. While the defense experts' conclusions
that Hackett showed deficits in adaptive functioning were challenged by the prosecution in light of the fact that he had operated two businesses and had spoken to his
mother about stock trading, the experts did not believe that these actions were inconsistent with their finding that Hackett was intellectually disabled. The Commonwealth's sole expert, a psychologist, relied on Hackett's pre-petition IQ scores in concluding that the Hackett was not intellectually disabled. He disputed the connection
between Hackett's exposure to certain chemicals and the drop in his IQ score and
testified that there was no evidence that Hackett's participation in a boxing program
caused brain damage. After hearing the testimony, the PCRA court found that the
42
defendant had proven his intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the PCRA court holding that its conclusion that Hackett was intellectually disabled was not supported by substantial evidence. In addition, the court found that the PCRA court had erred in improperly
equating borderline intellectual functioning with intellectual disability. Specifically,
the PCRA court erred in dismissing Hackett pre-petition IQ scores on the grounds that
the Commonwealth's expert could not vouch for the veracity or accuracy of the earlier
tests. Such a view, the court stated, ignores the standard of review that places the burden on the defendant to prove intellectual disability. In addition, the PCRA court failed
to give weight to the fact that Hackett was never diagnosed as intellectually
disabled until he sought Adkins relief. Further, the PCRA court improperly equated
evidence of learning disabilities or other neurological abnormality with proof establishing significant sub-average intellectual functioning. In addition, the defense failed
to provide adequate support for the theory that the dramatic drop in defendant's IQ
was caused by boxing and exposure to toxic chemicals and failed to identify evidence
of significant limitations in adaptive functioning. 43
Justice Baer dissented, joined by Justices Saylor and Todd. In the dissent's view, the
majority's conclusion that the record did not support the PCRA court's factual findings
was unsupportable under the standard of review on appeal. The dissent argued that
the evidence the majority relied upon in reversing the PCRA court had already been
considered and rejected by the fact-finder. In re-weighing the evidence, the dissent
claimed that the majority had "disregarded the most basic facet of appellate review"
that a reviewing court is bound by the factual and credibility determinations of the
PCRA court"where those findings are supported by the record."

INEFFECTIVENESS AND THE INTERSTATE
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD)44 establishes procedures for the transfer of prisoners incarcerated in one jurisdiction to the temporary custody of another
42. The PCRA court found that Hackett's post-petition IQ score placed Hackett in the range of mild mental retardation, that Hackett had not malingered on the post-petition test, that earlier IQ scores were unreliable, and that Hackett
had deficits in adaptive functioning.
43. The Court rejected the Commonwealth's request to adopt a more stringent Adkins framework.
44. Pennsylvania, forty-eight states, the District of Columbia and the United States have adopted the Agreement. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§9101 - 9108.
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jurisdiction which has lodged an untried charge detainer against a prisoner. Under
Article III of the Agreement, a prisoner against whom an untried charge detainer has
been lodged can request to be transferred and tried in the jurisdiction that lodged the
detainer. 45 The request requires that the lodging jurisdiction try the prisoner within
180 days of his or her request. 46 If the prisoner is not tried within the required time period, the charges are required to be dismissed with prejudice. 47 Under Article IV of the
Agreement, if the prosecutor in the state where the untried charges are pending initiates the transfer of the prisoner, trial of the prisoner must commence within 120 days
of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state.48
In Commonwealth v. Destephano,49 a case of first impression, the Superior Court considered whether the time limits of the IAD apply to an untried defendant once the
sentence in the sending state has been completed. After Destephano was charged with
multiple offenses in Pennsylvania, he was incarcerated in North Carolina. Following
notification of the Pennsylvania detainer, Destephano requested to be tried in Pennsylvania under Article III of the Agreement. Following his transfer to Pennsylvania and
while awaiting disposition of the Pennsylvania charges, Destephano completed his
North Carolina sentence. More than 180 days after he requested to be tried, Destephano
pled guilty to one count of the Pennsylvania charges. Thereafter, he sought PCRA relief alleging that the court that convicted and sentenced him did not have jurisdiction 50
and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek dismissal of charges based upon
the Commonwealth's failure to bring him to trial pursuant to the timeliness requirements of Articles III and IV of the Agreement. The PCRA court denied relief, finding
that the time limits set out in Articles III and IV of the Agreement did not apply once
Destephano was released from his North Carolina sentence.
The Superior Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief. Stating that its task was
solely one of statutory interpretation as no facts were in dispute, the court initially
noted that both Articles III and IV of the Agreement apply only to"prisoners" serving
a "term of imprisonment" in the sending state. In addition, the court stated that the
purpose of the Agreement to minimize the disruption that untried charges have on
the rehabilitation of a defendant is no longer relevant once the defendant's sentence
in the sending state has been completed. As a result, the court concluded that once
Destephano had completed his sentence in North Carolina, the time limits in the Agreement did not bar his prosecution in Pennsylvania. Because Destephano was not
entitled to dismissal of the charges, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a
motion to dismiss.

PCRA JURISDICTION AND THE PHILADELPHIA MUNICIPAL COURT
The Municipal Court in Philadelphia was established in 196851 to relieve the backlog of cases that existed within the County.52 The new court was given jurisdiction over
summary offenses, less serious criminal offenses for which no prison term may be imposed or which are punishable by imprisonment for a term of not more than 5 years
and certain civil actions except actions by or against a Commonwealth party. 53 For
criminal offenses, the defendant has the right of appeal for a trial de novo, including the

45. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9101 (IHl)(a).
46. Id.
47. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9101 (V)(c).
48. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9101 Iv(a),(c).
49. 87 A.3d 361 (Pa. Super. 2014).
50. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(1)(V'ii).
51. Pa. Const. Art.V, §6(c).
52. Commonwealth v. Harmon, 366 A.2d 895, 898-99 (Pa. 1976).
53. 42 Pa.C.S. §1123(a). 42 Pa.C.S. §8501 defines Commonwealth party as a"Commonwealth agency and any employee
thereof, but only with respect to an act within the scope of his office or employment."In Tork-Hiis v. Commonwealth, 735
A.2d 1256,1259 (Pa. 1969), the Court held that"the [C]ommonwealth and its agencies are distinct legal entities."
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right to trial by jury, in the court of common pleas. With one exception, the Municipal
54
Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia.
55
In another case of first impression, Commonwealth v. Martorano, the Superior Court
considered whether the Philadelphia Municipal Court has jurisdiction over PCRA
petitions. After being charged with multiple offenses, Martorano pled guilty in the
Municipal Court to two misdemeanor offenses. Her appeal to the Court of Common
Pleas was dismissed because of her guilty plea. Martorano filed a PCRA petition in the
Municipal Court alleging her lawyer had provided ineffective assistance in advising
her to plead guilty. 56 The court held an evidentiary hearing and permitted Martorano
to withdraw her plea and proceed to trial. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a writ
of certiorari to the Court of Common Pleas challenging the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court to grant PCRA relief. The common pleas court denied the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss and affirmed the Municipal Court's grant of relief under
the PCRA.
In vacating the order of the Municipal Court granting the defendant relief, the
Superior Court initially noted that notwithstanding the fact that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure govern PCRA proceedings, 57 a PCRA petition is in fact civil in nature. 58 In
addition, the court noted that the court of common pleas has original jurisdiction in
PCRA proceedings. 59 The court held that although the Municipal Court has jurisdiction over certain civil matters and concurrent jurisdiction with the court of common
pleas over certain criminal offenses, a petition seeking collateral relief from a criminal
conviction does not fit within the Municipal Court's limited civil jurisdiction or within
the court's limited concurrent jurisdiction. As a result, the court held that the Municipal Court did not have jurisdiction in PCRA proceedings. In a footnote, the court
noted the "significant ramifications" of its holding in light of the delay and backlog of
cases in the court of common pleas. The court acknowledged that the existing practice
of having Municipal Court judges rule on PCRA petitions was"eminently reasonable"
in light of Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(a) that provides that the judge who presided over the defendant's criminal case should rule on the defendant's PCRA petition. The court stated
that a remedy to this "unfortunate and... unintended result" will require "either legislative or Supreme Court action...."

CORAM NOBIS RELIEF WHERE PCRA DOES NOT
PROVIDE A REMEDY
The PCRA is the "sole means of obtaining collateral relief" and "encompasses all
60
other statutory and common law remedies"including habeas corpus and coram nobis.
Common law remedies continue to exist only in cases where a claim is not cognizable
under the Act. 61 If the claim is cognizable, a defendant "may only obtain relief under
the PCRA." 62Assuming the petition for post-conviction relief is timely,63 post-conviction relief is only available to defendants who are currently serving a sentence of

54. 42 Pa.C.S. §1123(b).
55. 89 A.3d 301 (Pa. Super. 2014).
56. Pa.R.Crim P.903(A) provides that the court should forward a PCRA petition to the trial judge. Commonwealth v.
Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 90 (Pa. 1998) ("Generally, it is deemed preferable for the same judge who presided at trial to preside over the post-conviction proceedings since familiarity with the case will likely assist the proper administration of
justice.").
57. Pa.R.Crim.P. 900 -910.
58. Commonwealth v. Haag, 809 A.2d 271, 284 (Pa. 2002).
59. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(a).
60. 42 Pa.C.S. §9542.
61. See e.g., Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007) (substantive due process challenge to validity of
recommitting the defendant to prison after he had been mistakenly set free not within ambit of PCRA); Commonwealth
v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511 (Pa. 2007) (alleged violation of defendant's rights under the International Covenant for Civil and
Political Rights not cognizable PCRA claim).
62. Commonwealth v. Pagan, 864 A.2d 1231,1233 (Pa. Super. 2004).
63. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b).
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imprisonment or on probation or parole at the time the petition is filed and at the
"time relief is granted."64
In Commonwealth v. Decardes,65 the Superior Court considered whether a defendant
who is no longer in custody can seek post-conviction relief by writ of coram nobis.
Decardes, a resident alien, pled guilty to a number of offenses and, after completing a
term of probation, left the country. When he attempted to return, immigration officials
denied him re-entry on the basis of his felony convictions. After seeking to withdraw
his guilty plea, Decardes filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis alleging plea
counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that he would be deported as a
consequence of his plea. The trial court treated the petition as a PCRA petition and
dismissed it as untimely. After the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 66
Decardes filed a second petition for writ of coram nobis. While the trial court again
treated the petition as having been filed under the PCRA, it nonetheless ordered
Decardes' guilty plea withdrawn, finding that deportation was a sentence under the
PCRA. 67
The Superior Court initially considered whether the trial court properly treated
Decardes petition for writ of coram nobis as a PCRA petition. The court concluded that
deportation, while a penalty, is not a sentence and that at the time Decardes sought relief, he was no longer in custody. As such, he was not eligible for PCRA relief. The court
then turned to the question of whether Decardes' underlying claim was cognizable
under the PCRA. While claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are explicitly within the
purview of the PCRA, the court concluded that Decardes' claim of ineffectiveness of
counsel did not exist until Padillawas decided, which was several years after Decardes
had completed his sentence. As such, the court concluded that the instant case was
"one of the rare instances in which the PCRA fails to provide a remedy for the claim."
Because Decardes' claim was not recognized until after the time he had to file a timely
PCRA petition, the court concluded that the trial court erred in treating his request for
relief as a PCRA petition. In addition, the court held that because Decardes was no
longer in custody but "continues to suffer the serious consequences of deportation,"
the trial court should have treated his petition as one seeking "coram nobis relief."
Lastly, the court concluded that Decardes was not entitled to coram nobis relief in light
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chaidez v. United States,68 holding that
Padillaannounced a new rule of constitutional law that was not applicable to defendants whose conviction became final before Padillawas decided. 69
THE PCRA AND MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES
In Alleyne v. United States,70 the United States Supreme Court considered whether its
decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey71 applied to mandatory minimum sentences. In

64. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a). In Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754 (Pa. 2013), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the requirement that a defendant seeking relief under the PCRA must be in custody both at the time the petition is filed and when relief is granted. The Court noted that by limiting collateral relief to those serving sentences of
confinement, the legislature simply chose not to provide a collateral review process for defendants who have completed
their sentence. Due process, the Court said, does not require a state to provide unlimited opportunities for collateral relief of constitutional claims.The Court went on to reject the use of habeas corpus or coram nobis where the defendant's
sentence was completed during the time her PCRA petition was pending.
65. 101 A.3d 105 (Pa. Super. 2014), appealgranted, 112 A.3d 1207 (Pa. 2015).
66. 559 U.S. 356 ((2010). In Padilla, the Court held that where deportation consequences of a guilty plea are "truly
clear," counsel must inform his non-citizen client that a guilty plea will make him eligible for deportation.
67. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2)(vii).
68. 133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013).
69. In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Bowes argued that the majority erred in concluding that the defendant properly invoked coram nobis to obtain review of his untimely ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In Judge
Bowes' view, defendant's ineffectiveness claim was cognizable under the PCRA and, as such, the defendant was foreclosed from seeking relief by means of a common law writ even though he could not obtain PCRA relief because he was
no longer in custody.
70. 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013).
71. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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Apprendi, the Court held that other than a prior conviction, any fact that increases "the
penalty for the crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum"must be found by the
72
factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant at his guilty plea.
In Alleyne, the Court applied Apprendi and held that a defendant has a constitutional
right to have a jury decide whether a fact that leads to the imposition
of a mandatory
73
minimum sentence has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Commonwealth v. Riggle,74 the defendant's sentence included a mandatory mini-

mum term of five years' imprisonment. Following appeal, Riggle filed a timely PCRA
petition alleging ineffectiveness of counsel. In response to the PCRA court's notice of
intention to dismiss without a hearing, Riggle claimed his sentence was illegal under
Alleyne. The PCRA court's denial of relief was affirmed by the Superior Court. The
Superior Court noted that while it had applied Alleyne to cases pending on direct appeal, the question presented in Riggle was whether Alleyne is retroactive and therefore
applicable to defendants seeking collateral review. In Riggle, the court noted that in
Teague v. Lane,75 the United States Supreme Court established a framework for determining whether a constitutional ruling such as Alleyne should be applied"retroactively
to judgments in criminal cases that are already final on direct review."76 Under Teague,
an "old rule," namely an extension or clarification of a principle already established,
applies to defendants on both direct and collateral review. On the other hand, a new
rule, defined as a ruling that"breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the
States and Federal Government," 77 is generally applicable only to cases that are still on
direct review.78 Teague recognized two exceptions to the general rule that new rules do
not apply to cases on collateral review: (1) a new substantive rule that forbids "criminal punishment of certain primary conduct" or prohibits "a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants" 79 and (2) "watershed rules of criminal procedure: ...

those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished." 80
The Superior Court concluded that "Alleyne is undoubtedly a new constitutional

rule"because it overruled a prior Supreme Court decision. Alleyne was not substantive
in nature because it did not"prohibit punishment for a class of offenders" or decrimi-

nalize conduct. In concluding that Alleyne did not announce a "watershed procedural
rule," 81 the court relied upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Schriro v.
Summerlin.82 In Schriro, the Court concluded that the rule in Ring v. Arizona 83 that

72. In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Court held that the statutory maximum for purposes of Apprendi
is the "maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant."
73. In Alleyne, the Court held that the elements of a crime include "not only facts that increase the ceiling but also
those that increase the floor" of the punishment to which the defendant may be subjected. Alleyne expressly overruled
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) in which the Court held that a mandatory minimum sentence did not result in
a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum.
74. 119 A.3d 1058 (Pa. Super. 2015).
75. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
76. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S.Ct. 1173 (2007).
77. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
78. In Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008), the Supreme Court held that state courts are not bound by Teague and
may choose the standard for deciding whether new rules of federal constitutional procedure are applicable to defendants seeking collateral review. In Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa. 2013), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
noted that it had"generally looked to the Teague doctrine in determining retroactivity of new federal constitutional rulings"but acknowledged that"this practice is subject to potential refinement"noting thatTeague is not"necessarily a natural model for retroactivity jurisprudence as applied at the state level."
79. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
80. Teague, 489 US. at 311, 313. In Teague, the Court noted that the"watershed rule" exception was"extremely narrow"
and the Court thought it unlikely that any such rules" halve] yet to emerge."
81. The court in Riggle noted that several Circuit Courts of Appeal, including the SecondThird, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh
and Tenth Circuits have determined that in the context of second or successive federal habeas corpus petitions Alleyne
does not apply retroactively. In contrast to state courts considering the issue, in federal habeas corpus proceedings, "a
new rule is not made 'retroactive to cases on collateral review' unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive." Tyler
v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001).
82. 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
83. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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Apprendi required a jury determination of an aggravating circumstance before a death
sentence may be imposed was not a"watershed procedural rule"because a jury finding of an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt was not central to an
accurate determination that death is a legally appropriate punishment. With respect to
mandatory minimum sentences, the Superior Court concluded that absent a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the fact that would trigger a mandatory minimum,
the defendant could receive the identical sentence. 84 As a result, a jury determination
is not central to the "fundamental fairness of the trial" or the sentencing decision.
Because Alleyne was not retroactive, 85 Riggle was not entitled to collateral relief.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Pa.R.Crim.P 910 and a PCRA Order Granting
and Denying Relief
Pa.R.Crim.P. 910 governing appeals in PCRA cases provides that an order"granting,
denying, dismissing or otherwise finally disposing" of a PCRA petition is a"final order
for purposes of appeal." In Commonwealth v. Gaines,86 the Superior Court considered
the application of Rule 910 to a PCRA order that granted in part and denied in part the
issues presented in the PCRA petition. After his judgment of sentence was affirmed on
direct appeal, Gaines filed a timely PCRA petition raising a number of claims including that counsel was ineffective in failing to bring to the sentencing court's attention
a miscalculation concerning his prior record score. After the PCRA court scheduled a
resentencing hearing based on a stipulation of the parties that the Gaines's original
sentence was based on an improperly calculated prior record score, the court granted
Gaines leave to file an amended PCRA petition presenting additional claims.
Following a hearing, the court on July 15,2013, entered an order granting Gaines relief
on one sentencing claim and denying all claims for a new trial. The order was mailed
to Gaines on July 17, 2013. Also on July 17, 2013, the court resentenced Gaines.
Thereafter, on August 19, 2013, Gaines filed a notice of appeal from the PCRA court's
order denying his guilt phase claims for relief.
At issue on appeal was whether Gaines's appeal was timely.87 Gaines claimed that
the appeal was timely because the July 15 order was not final and that the final order
was the order imposed at the completion of the trial court proceeding ordered by the
PCRA court's grant of relief. 88 In rejecting Gaines's position, the court noted that
Gaines's entire argument on appeal related to the PCRA court's order of July 15,2013,
denying his guilt phase claims for PCRA relief. 89 The Superior Court held that the
PCRA court's July 15 order was a final order under Pa.R.Crim.P.910 because it ended
collateral proceedings in the matter. The new sentencing proceeding ordered by the
PCRA court was a "trial court function" and not a PCRA proceeding. The court concluded that the PCRA court's July 15, 2013 order disposed of all of Gaines's claims in
his PCRA petition. As such, Gaines's notice of appeal was due August 16,2013,30 days

84. Consistent with Alleyne, a judge may use a fact about the defendant or the defendant's crime to increase the sentence within, rather than outside, the prescribed sentencing range.
85. See alsoVerge v. State, 50 Kan. App. 591 (2015).
86. 2015 Pa. Super Lexis (Nov. 5, 2015) (en banc).
87. The Superior Court initially quashed the appeal as untimely. The court granted reargument en banc and directed
the parties to file supplemental briefs on whether the untimeliness of defendant's notice of appeal divested the court of
jurisdiction to consider defendant's claims.
88. Following resentencing on July 17, 2013, the defendant filed a post-sentence motion. On July 30, 2013, the trial
court issued an order granting the motion and correcting the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive Act eligibility component of defendant's sentence.
89. The court noted that in Commonwealth v. Bryant, 780 A.2d 646 (Pa. 2001), a capital case, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that when the PCRA court denies all claims of relief with respect to the guilt phase, but orders a new penalty
hearing, the court's order is final for purposes of appeal. The court rejected the defendant's argument that Bryant was
applicable only in capital cases.
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from July 17, 2013. Because the notice of appeal on August 19, 2013 was untimely, the
court held it was without jurisdiction and quashed the appeal. 90
Request for an Evidentiary Hearing and Required Certification
The PCRA requires that a request for an evidentiary hearing include a certification,
signed by the defendant, as to each intended witness which identifies the witness's
name, address, date of birth, the expected substance of his or her testimony and any
documents material to that testimony. 91 In Commonwealth v. Lippert,92 the Commonwealth argued in the Superior Court that Lippert had failed to preserve his appellate
issues because the witness certification he had attached to his petition was deficient.
Although the court agreed that the certification was deficient, it concluded that it could
not affirm the PCRA court's order dismissing Lippert's petition. The Superior Court
stated that in both the PCRA court's notice of intention to dismiss 93 and its order formally dismissing the defendant's petition, the court stated only that the petition lacked
issues of arguable merit. The PCRA court did not refer to Lippert's deficient witness
certification. The court noted that Pa.R.Crim.P.905 governing amendments to PCRA
petitions "is intended to provide petitioners with a legitimate opportunity to present
their claims"in a manner to"avoid dismissal due to a correctable defect...."The court
concluded that when a PCRA court is presented with a petition that "is defective in
form or content," the PCRA court has the responsibility of informing the defendant of
the nature of the defect and providing the defendant an opportunity to amend.
Because this did not occur here, the court remanded the case to the PCRA court with
direction that Lippert be permitted to amend his certification. 94

A Second Petition and the One-Year Filing Period
In Commonwealth v. Callahan,95 Callahan filed a timely PCRA petition raising a number of ineffectiveness claims including that counsel was ineffective in failing to file a
post-sentence motion and in failing to preserve a sufficiency of the evidence claim.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court on March 22, 2012, reinstated
Callahan's right to file a post-sentence motion and his right to file direct appeal nunc
pro tunc.The court denied his remaining claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. Instead
of filing a post-sentence motion and a direct appeal, Callahan appealed the PCRA
court's denial of his other claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. On March 11, 2013, the
Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court. Thereafter, on April 30, 2013, Callahan filed
a second PCRA petition alleging first PCRA counsel was ineffective. Again, the PCRA
court denied relief and Callahan appealed.

90. President Judge Emeritus Bender joined by President Judge Gantman and Judge Shogan dissented. In Judge
Bender's view, the July 15, 2013 order was a"hybrid order that was not final for purposes of Pa.R.Crim.P. 910."The final
order, in the dissent's view, was the lower court's order of July 30, 2013 that finalized the PCRA proceeding. The dissent
viewed the Bryant decision as applying only in capital cases and that its application to non-capital cases will result in
"waiver trap" in which pro se litigants and attorneys not experienced in PCRA litigation may presume that the defendant must wait until resentencing to file an appeal. Such a presumption, the dissent noted, is "logical" because filing
notice of appeal prior to being resentenced will result in the lower court losing jurisdiction in the matter and staying
resentencing until appeal from the denial of his non-sentencing claims is completed.
91. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(d)(1).
92. 85 A.3d 1095 (Pa. Sup. 2014).
93. Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).
94. In the trial court, Lippert entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of indecent assault. In his PCRA petition,
Lippert claimed counsel was ineffective for misinforming him that he would not have to register as a sexual offender
following the entry of his plea. In concluding that the defendant's claim had arguable merit and he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court held that although sexual offender registration requirements are collateral consequences of pleading guilty or nolo contendere and that a defendant's lack of knowledge of the registration requirements
does not undermine the validity of a plea, counsel is nonetheless ineffective where he misinforms his client about the
consequences of a guilty plea, whether the consequences are"direct"or"collateral." See Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d
185,191-92 (Pa. Super. 2013).
95. 101 A.3d 118 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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The issue before the Superior Court was whether Callahan's second PCRA petition
was timely.96 The court noted that when in response to a first petition, a PCRA court
reinstates direct appeal nunc pro tunc, a subsequent PCRA petition is considered a first
petition for timeliness purposes. 97 The court stated the issue of whether Callahan's
second petition was timely depended upon when Callahan's judgment of sentence became final. 98 In concluding that his judgment of sentence became final on April 23,
2012, the last date that Callahan could have filed his direct appeal nunc pro tunc, 99 the
court stated that a judgment of sentence became final immediately upon expiration of
the time for seeking direct review "even if other collateral proceedings are still ongoing." Finally, the court concluded that its timeliness analysis was not affected by the
fact that Callahan was precluded from filing a second petition prior to April 11, 2013,100
101
while his appeal of the partial denial of his first PCRA petition was still pending.
Because Callahan was required to file his second PCRA petition on or before April 23,
2013, his later filed petition was untimely.

CONCLUSION
Recent decisions include significant rulings on issues of timeliness, waiver, jurisdiction, ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel, and the common law writ of coram nobis. The
Superior Court clarified the due diligence requirement with respect to after-discovered evidence claims and limited the presumption of access to public records. The
court reaffirmed that a defendant can challenge the effectiveness of PCRA counsel in
response to the PCRA court's notice of intention to dismiss, but refused to find that the
notice was defective because it did not inform the defendant that an ineffectiveness
claim was waived unless raised in the PCRA court. In a decision that will be reviewed
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Superior Court found the trial court erred
when it failed to address defendant's request for collateral relief as a petition for writ
of coram nobis. Finally, the court concluded that the Municipal Court of Philadelphia
does not have jurisdiction in PCRA matters and that a PCRA court must provide the
defendant an opportunity to amend a defective petition prior to dismissal.

96. Although not addressed by the parties, the court noted that it could raise the issue of timeliness sua sponte because the issue implicates the jurisdiction of the court. Commonwealth v. Grandy, 38 A.3d 899, 902 (Pa. Super. 2012).
97. Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283,1286 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 91 A.3d 162 (Pa. 2014).
98. 42 Pa.C.S.§9545(b) provides in pertinent part that"[a]ny petition ... including a second or subsequent petition,
shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final....
99. The court rejected the later date of April 10, 2013 as the date the judgment became final.This date represents the
end of the period following the Superior Court's decision affirming the PCRA court's denial of PCRA relief in which the
defendant could seek allocator.
100. 30 days after the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's denial of relief.
101. Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 2000) ("[When an appellant's PCRA appeal is pending before a
court, a subsequent PCRA petition cannot be filed until resolution of review of the pending PCRA court by the highest
state court in which review is sought, or upon expiration of the time for seeking such review.").

